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The Use and Abuse of Socrates in Present Day Teaching 
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 Abstract  The Greek philosopher Socrates is used as an example of a master teacher in in
many contexts, from elementary school discussions, to college philosophy classes, to law
school.  I examine a number of current uses of Socratic teaching, and expose inconsistencies
among them.  I analyze critically recent practitioners of Socratic teaching, such as Mortimer
Adler, and I consider how the celebrated primary teacher Vivian Gussin Paley enacts the
Socratic legacy in a novel way.  I argue that the misuse, or abuse, of the Socratic legacy
occurs chiefly when his teaching is interpreted narrowly as a pedagogical technique devoid
of context and irony. 
Introduction 
  The title of my paper is a deliberate play upon Friedrich Nietzsche's well-known
essay, The Use and Abuse of History (1874, 1979).  In that work, Nietzsche turned his eye
upon his culture to decry what he termed its "malignant historical fever" (p. 4).  He believed
that a mere studying of the past, particularly by self-absorbed scholars, was not a vital use of
historical tradition.  Rather, knowledge of the past must instead serve both the present and
future (p. 22), and not become merely an abstract item devoid of the context that initially
gave it life (pp. 11-12). 
  Today, such a figure from the past serves as an important model and inspiration for
much current pedagogy.  The Greek philosopher Socrates is used as an example of the
master teacher in many contexts, from philosophy classes to law school.  There is effort
underway to incorporate "Socratic" dialogue into many programs at the precollegiate level
(Lipman et. al., 1980; Obermiller, 1989).  On the surface, then, it would seem that this
particular bit of history, brought to life for us through Plato, Xenophon, and Aristophanes, is
also alive in teaching and learning, beyond the careful scholarship of the university classicist
or philosopher. 
  This diversity in the use of the legacy of Socrates in current pedagogy does signify a
vital tradition.  Many of the uses of this legacy are admirable.  Yet, understandings of a
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"Socratic method" differ widely.  There is, for example, disagreement over whether Socrates
offered a pedagogical method as that term is understood today.  I propose to examine a
number of uses of Socratic pedagogy in different contexts in order to show inconsistency
among them, particularly in reference to the Platonic Socrates.  I build upon other recent
work (Haroutunian-Gordon, 1991; Burbules, 1993; Pekarsky, 1994) that explore the Socratic
legacy for education, while offering insights into additional recent Socratic practitioners
(Paley, 1986, 1990; Adler, 1982, 1990; Weiss, 1987). 
  I conclude that there is widespread use of the term "Socratic" in descriptions of
certain types of teaching.  Yet, when Socratic teaching is taken to mean everything from
dialectical examination of philosophical issues of justice, the good, and the like, (Gray,
1988) to the use of questions by a teacher, independent of the subject matter (Kay and
Young, 1986), there needs to be a clearer understanding of the uses of the Socratic legacy for
teaching. 
Background:  Some Recent Commentators on Socrates 
  Several current critical views of Socrates should be taken into account if we are to
fully understand and be able to appraise critically that legacy.  Moreover, such criticism is a
key element in a determination of the uses of Socrates for present day teaching, as I shall
argue at the end of this paper.  Recent commentators on both the historical and Platonic
Socrates, among them Bruce Kimball (1986), I. F. Stone (1988), and Friedrich Nietzsche
(1872, 1956), have been critical of Socrates and his legacy.  Stone sees a Socrates as the
enemy of the nascent Greek democracy, Nietzsche portrays a degenerate destroyer of the
heroic legacy of the tragic age of Greece, and Kimball rues the emphasis of Socratic
rationality over Ciceronian oratory in liberal education. 
  Nietzsche, though of at least two minds about Socrates (Dannhauser, 1974, especially
pp. 269f.), began his career with a full-force attack upon the Greek.  In The Birth of Tragedy
(1872, 1956), he laments the emergence of the Socratic spirit of exhaustive analysis that put
an end to the Apollinian-Dionysian mix that spawned early Greek tragedy.  Nietzsche notes
that Socrates was incapable of appreciating the earlier tragedians, like Aeschylus, and only
attended the plays of Euripides (whom Nietzsche sneeringly calls the first rational tragedian
(pp. 81-83).  Socrates’s insistence upon painstaking analysis signaled for Nietzsche not only
the end of the vitality of Greek culture, but also the beginning of an age of men with
diminished spirits dependent upon rational analysis rather than creative myth. 
  An even more blistering attack, though from a different angle, comes from the late
journalist I. F. Stone (1988).  Stone sees Socrates as democracy's enemy, one who believed
that the herd of men needed to be firmly ruled (p. 38).  This political view, coupled with the
belief that knowledge is absolute and unattainable, and that virtue and knowledge could not
be taught (pp. 63f.), makes it difficult for Stone to see how Socrates could be defended as a
teacher or even citizen of Athens.  Stone's book made a splash in the trade press because he
attempted to defend Athenian democracy against Socrates. 
  A more measured critique of Socrates's influence can be found in Bruce Kimball's
widely discussed book, Orators and Philosophers (1986).  Kimball points out that the
philosophical tradition of Socrates has won out in contemporary liberal education over the
oratorical tradition of Cicero.  Kimball sees a tension between the pursuit of knowledge on
the one hand, and the recognition and maintenance of the importance of historical traditions
within learning communities on the other hand. 
  Kimball's discussion has crucial educational import.  It challenges us to find ways to
keep alive the Socratic spirit, however corrosive or parasitic of myth and culture, while also
maintaining an appreciation and a cultivation of tradition and custom advocated in the
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Ciceronian oratorical view.  This challenge was of course Nietzsche's own too, made clear in
The Use and Abuse of History.  We shall keep this theme from Kimball and Nietzsche in
mind as we examine contemporary Socratic pedagogy. 
  Such views were not voiced specifically apropos of educational practice; yet they are
key to understanding Socratic pedagogy today.  This import is evident in a heated published
exchange between Richard Paul and Louis Goldman concerning the role of Socratic inquiry
in the schools (Goldman,1984; Paul,1984).  Goldman believes that Socratic questioning can
be dangerous if begun too early:  "A proper education of the young must begin with a firm
grounding in the nature and values of our culture" (Goldman, 1984, p. 60; see also Nietzsche
1872, 1956; Beatty, 1984; Kimball, 1986).  He notes that Plato advocated dialectics only
after a long preparatory education.  Socratic questioning can become dynamite in the wrong
hands, and we only approximate his practice (p. 62).  Goldman recommends that we attend
to traditional (Ciceronian, in Kimball's term) education for the young, and not encourage too
early an introduction to dialectics. 
  Richard Paul, perhaps the most well known advocate of critical thinking in the
schools, disagrees with Goldman.  He believes that we must foster the habit of thinking
critically at the same time and in tandem with an appreciation of culture.  He takes up the
challenge offered by Kimball and others.  To borrow Kimball's terms, Paul believes that a
synthesis of Socratic inquiry and Ciceronian traditionalism should be fostered.  Paul goes
further by making a claim common to theorists interested in philosophy for the young
(Matthews, 1980; Lipman, Sharp, & Oscanyan, 1980).  Thinking philosophically occurs
naturally in children.  Infectious curiosity manifested in childlike wonder and the persistent
questioning that attends such wonder should be harnessed by a sensitive teacher to further
the appreciation of cultural traditions and other educational aims. 
Socrates as Teacher:  A Reexamination 
  Prominent philosophers of education extend these perspectives, from Nietzsche to
current debates in the area of critical thinking.  Perhaps the most sustained attempt to
grapple with the legacy of Socrates for pedagogy has been made by Sophie
Haroutunian-Gordon and her colleagues (Hansen 1988; Haroutunian-Gordon 1987, 1988,
1989, 1990, 1991; Haroutunian and Jackson 1986). 
  Through a close reading of several of the Socratic dialogues, particularly the Gorgias,
Meno, Philebus, Phaedo, and Protagoras, Haroutunian-Gordon challenges the notion of a
"Socratic method."  For instance, she points out Socratic inconsistencies that call into
question use of the term.  She makes a further claim that the reason Socrates does not follow
a prescribed formal method is that he is in what educational researchers now call an
"ill-structured teaching situation."  Following a predetermined dialectical blueprint will not
suffice for the way that a discussion may have gone "awry" (Haroutunian-Gordon, 1988, p.
231).  In such situations, the questions one asks depend on the content of the conversation,
and how nuance and shadings of meaning issue forth their own structure.  Certainly many
post-Wittgensteinian philosophers, as diverse as Grice and Gadamer, have explored this
phenomenon long known to writers of imaginative literature.  For our purposes, so too have
experienced teachers known how to work their way out of ill-structured situations to effect
learning for diverse students. 
  Elsewhere, by way of showing again the inadequacy of a formal description of
Socrates’s teaching, Haroutunian-Gordon attempts to "identify pedagogical aims" (1987, pp.
119f.) by giving four suggestions about what these might be:  1) bring interlocutors to
aporia; 2) pursue truth about fundamental questions; 3) teach proper intellectual habits; 4)
modify the moral principles of the interlocutors.  Though Socrates may advocate the
philosophical life via these aims according to Haroutunian-Gordon, he does not demand that
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others follow this life, nor are these purported aims necessarily relevant to the "task of
explaining why he did what he did in the dialogues" (1987, p. 129).  Haroutunian-Gordon's
arguments are important, for they powerfully undermine an easy mimicry of the use of
Plato's Socrates in one's pedagogy. 
Socratic Pedagogy in the Meno 
  The Socratic legacy offered up by Haroutunian-Gordon and her colleagues, along
with the views discussed by recent commentators, make it difficult to see how Socrates has
become such a pervasive pedagogical model.  He says repeatedly that he is not a teacher, and
then seems almost intent on proving that claim by irony, inconsistent action, and an
occasional long-winded speech, as at the end of the Gorgias.  Yet, perhaps we can turn to
one place where many have looked when they speak of Socratic teaching, Plato’s dialogue
Meno.   An old man drawing geometric figures in the sand for a young slave boy is a
powerful image of what many believe Socratic teaching to be. 
  Nevertheless, we must be careful with this seemingly transparent instance of
pedagogy.  Though an important theme of the dialogue comes when Socrates extracts the
distinction between knowledge and true opinion through coaxing and vivid imagery, his
supposed drawing out of the recollected geometric wisdom from the slave boy is
troublesome as a display of pedagogy. 
  Socrates begins his lesson by putting words in the mouth of the slave boy (82B f.).  Is
this a convincing display of pedagogy?  Leaving aside the blatant (to my eyes at least)
problems of power and dominance of an elderly Greek citizen teaching a slave boy, this
example of teaching has always left me cold.  It is not apparent at all that teaching has
occurred though it is a convincing display of inference as R. E. Allen (1959) has pointed
out.  It is not made clear in the dialogue that the slave boy is somehow capable of using his
knowledge.  He appears more like a sounding board for Socrates, who here seems to be just
a mouthpiece for the theories of recollection (anamnesis) and innate knowledge. 
  I grant that a more generous reading of the Meno that sets aside this power
differential is possible (Macmillan and Garrison, 1988; Burbules, 1993, pp. 120-122).  Here
Socrates is actually teaching when he asks his leading questions of the slave boy, because
these questions are disguised answers to the questions that the boy should be asking.  These
questions are "stepwise" (Burbules, 1993, p. 122) in an instructional kind of dialogue where
the end is known by the teacher, and implicitly known by the slave boy (Macmillan and
Garrison, 1988, p. 154).  
 
Contemporary Inspiration:  Capturing, and Missing, the Socratic Spirit 
  Though the Meno may be troublesome to some as pedagogy, it has provided
inspiration to classroom teachers.  The famous passage (80A-B) where Meno chides
Socrates for being like the electric ray (or torpedo) for delivering perplexing questions has
provided Donald Thomas (1985) with a way to teach so that students will go out on their
own and dig under the surface.  In a brief and thoughtful essay, Thomas describes an episode
in his early secondary school teaching career when he dramatically presented a sermon by
the Puritan preacher Jonathan Edwards for his students.  He wanted to stun his students into
a perplexity that might be uncomfortable, much as Socrates makes Meno uncomfortable
with his persistent questions.  Thomas wanted them to see Edwards come alive so that these
contemporary students would not forget the Puritan's images.  The "torpedo's touch" was
there, much to the chagrin of a team of behaviorally oriented evaluators in the back of the
room. 
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  Many years after this incident, Thomas still uses the "torpedo's touch" in his
pedagogical array.  Like Socrates, he often begins with pleasantries and surface talk, waiting
for the right moment to deliver the stark and perplexing questions that may provoke wonder
coupled with a realization of ignorance in his students (p. 222).  Yet, Thomas's essay is too
brief for him to give us examples of his questions, and to recreate a number of different
pedagogical scenarios.  Furthermore, we would want to know just how his questions were
akin to those of Socrates beyond being perplexing and intellectually numbing. 
  While Thomas has taken inspiration from Socrates in his classroom practice, others
attempt to devise Socratic teaching strategies devoid of such spirit.  Some of the most
flagrant "abuses" associated with using Socrates as a pedagogic model come when
superficial aspects of the Platonic Socrates are used uncritically as pedagogic strategies. 
  Fishman (1985) notes several of these "misconceptions."  The Socratic method is
often seen and used today as an open-ended question and answer process (p. 185).  Kay and
Young (1986) equate Socratic teaching with asking more questions in the classroom and
with the encouragement of students to become independent and autonomous thinkers.  They
compare Socratic questioning with a teaching strategy called "ReQuest," developed by the
educationist Anthony Manzo.  No mention of content or aim of the questions is given by
Kay and Young; apparently to them it seems sufficient that the teacher is a full-time
questioner in order to be dubbed Socratic. 
Beyond Inspiration:  Current Socratic Teaching 
  In what follows, I explore a number of examples of Socratic teaching strategies that
have gone beyond either drawing inspiration from the dialogues or missing that inspiration. 
A weakness in Thomas's approach is that a pedagogical strategy, rich with examples, is not
spelled out in his brief essay.  On the other hand, if an understanding of the Socratic mission
is absent, we may be led to the lifting and distorting of formal qualities of Socratic practice
in our teaching,  as with Kay and Young (1986).  The teaching of Vivian Gussin Paley and
another Chicago based Socratic practitioner, Mortimer Adler, provide our next examples as
we enrich our horizon concerning Socratic pedagogy. 
  Vivian Paley, recently retired from years of teaching kindergarten, tells us of
numbness of a different kind from that of Thomas's "torpedo's touch."  She describes
candidly her lack of interest and enjoyment in her early years of teaching (1986).  She
happened to observe a colleague using the "old Socratic method" (p. 123) she too had once
used as a Great Books discussion leader.  Then she began to realize how excited she was
about the process of thinking going on in the minds of her students.  She now affirms the
place of this process over any other outcome, or product, in her teaching (1990).  Children
are not interested in answers, she claims, but are fascinated by process (1990; see also
Matthews, 1980) and entranced by meaning making and the play of language. 
  The impetus for renewed interest and curiosity about her own teaching came from the
hard realization that she did not know the answers to the questions that her young charges
were posing.  Paley was thus forced to keep asking relevant questions, based not on her own
preconceptions, but rather on how the child was thinking about a topic (1986, p. 124).  The
classroom drama, in which her students enacted imaginative stories of their own
construction, became for her "a paper chain of magical imaginings mixed with some solid
facts" (1986, p. 123).  This paper chain offered Paley abundant opportunities for her version
of Socratic probing. 
  Yet Paley the teacher goes beyond Socratic questioning in the classroom.  She turns
the questioning reflexively upon herself and her own thinking with a "specific tool" (1990)
she has used for years, the tape recorder.  Paley tapes daily ninety minutes of her students'
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stories and the accompanying dialogue.  The tape recorder, with its "unrelenting fidelity"
(1986, p. 123) trained her to listen precisely to what the children say.  In transcribing the
taped dialogue, large chunks of which appear in her books, Paley has the opportunity to
review all that went on in the classroom.  Using what she calls an "internalized Socratic
method" (Obermiller, 1986, p. 19), she takes herself to task in preparation for her writing,
asking herself questions like "why did I ignore that question?" or "is that something I could
have taken up with him?" (1990). 
  For Paley, this activity is part of the "intellectual game of teaching" (1990). 
Interacting with preschoolers as they play with blocks is not merely play, but also the
process of thinking and intellectual inquiry.  Her exhausting teaching, taping, and
transcribing regimen is an important living manifestation of the Socratic notion of the worth
of the examined life.  This element of reflexive inquiry aimed at self-knowledge, difficult to
achieve, is absent from such purported Socratic teaching advocated by practitioners like Kay
and Young. 
  Paley's methods have attracted attention and acclaim.  Yet Mortimer Adler and his
supporters espouse an even more widespread version of Socratic teaching.  Adler's Paideia
Proposal (1982) is one of the key documents of the recent school reform movement.  In this
brief work he advocates three interrelated ways of learning (p. 23) that should be followed
by all students regardless of age or ability:  1) the acquisition of knowledge by lectures,
memorization, and other means; 2) the development of intellectual skills, through coaching;
3) the enlargement of understanding through Socratic discussion of ideas and texts. 
However, the overwhelming majority of the focus given in the implementation of the
Paideia Proposal, has been on the third type of learning, the Socratic seminar (Gray, 1988,
Sizer, 1984, Chapter 5).  Let us turn to a discussion of Adler's version of Socratic pedagogy. 
  Adler's description of seminar pedagogy is deceptively simple:  A "discussion in
which students both ask and answer questions" (1982, p. 53).   One of his close associates,
Patricia Weiss, defines a seminar as:  "(an) educationally oriented discussion in which ideas,
issues, or principles are examined...The main teaching method used in seminars is one of
questioning and examining responses.  This style of teaching is often referred to as Socratic
teaching, named after Socrates who used questions in his teaching of the youth of Athens in
400 BC" (1987, p. 1; emphasis added). 
  Weiss then describes the three tasks of the seminar leader proposed by Adler:  " 1) to
ask a series of questions, 2) to examine the answers by trying to draw out the reasons for
them, or their implications, 3) to engage the participants in a two-way talk with one another
when views appear to be in conflict" (p. 1).  I can recognize Socrates in 1 and 2, though I
cannot recall anywhere in the dialogues where Socrates encourages his interlocutors to
debate each other.  Rather, with few exceptions (Callicles comes to mind), these
interlocutors are more likely to give monosyllabic replies to Socrates's withering questions,
prompting more than one reader to wonder just how dialogic these accounts were intended
to be. 
  One the other hand, though this Adlerian technique may not be true to the Platonic
Socrates, might it be seen as a commendable development of Socratic practice?  After all it
does seem odd (unless you consider Plato's own agenda for his created characters) that these
interlocutors, many of whom are absurdly laconic, rarely argue amongst themselves (the
Gorgias being a striking exception).  Sadly, though, at least in my repeated observation of
seminars led by Adler himself and some of his associates, this third task of a seminar leader
is as rarely practiced today as it might have been in ancient Athens. 
  Let us now turn to a closer examination of how Weiss practices Socratic teaching.  In
her manual that accompanies the videotapes of Adler leading seminars for high school
students (1987), Weiss provides a detailed discussion of how to structure a seminar.  She
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suggests that the teacher first set an atmosphere that will allow students to feel at ease in
asking questions.  This may include putting to one side any expertises students may bring to
the text at hand (Gray, 1988) so that general discussion among (near) equals may be
established.  Weiss begins her classes with a variety of nonthreatening questioning
techniques (e.g., round robin, voting, random call on whether students like or dislike
Socrates are typical in her teaching of the Apology) to get discussion going. 
  Once discussion is underway, Weiss may move to ask whether Socrates is a teacher,
opinions on the charges made against him in the Apology, or whether he is guilty or
innocent.  Like Haroutunian-Gordon (1988), Weiss acknowledges the "ill-structured
teaching situation" through this emphasis upon making teachers aware of the importance of
being prepared to ask unscripted follow-up questions (Weiss, 1987, p. 2).  These practices
are all commendable, but they rest upon a crucial assumption, made clear by another Paideia
advocate, Dennis Gray.  Even as Gray asserts that Socrates had no syllabus, he declares that
the purpose of Socratic teaching is to focus always on texts, with even the opening question
based upon a close study of the text at hand (1988). 
  The changes we moderns have made in the name of Socrates could not be clearer. 
Socrates, of course, did not use a common reading around a seminar table.  Furthermore, this
assertion by Gray makes apparent another related assumption of the Paideia method, namely
that great works will contain great ideas. 
The Dark Side of the Socratic Legend 
  The image of Socratic teaching presented above has been mixed.  Socrates can be
difficult and disarming.  Yet we educators are often intent upon seeing Socrates in the warm
glow of history as the one who began humanistic inquiry.  In this section, I shall return to an
unromantic view of Socrates that I have so far only presented through other writers such as
Stone and Nietzsche. 
  I shall suggest the importance, though with qualifications, of the dark side of the
Socratic spirit by turning to some first-hand accounts of legal pedagogy, and the use of the
"Socratic method" in law schools.  In spite of Adler's inroads into the nation's schools, the
popular image of Socratic teaching often comes from the so-called "Socratic method" used
in law schools.  I gleaned insight from colleagues from graduate school who hold the
doctoral degree in philosophy and have also studied law. 
  Many of us have never entered a law class, but we feel that we know what goes on
there.  We have seen John Houseman's portrayal of Professor Kingsfield in the film and
television show, "The Paper Chase."  Houseman's depiction of an unforgiving taskmaster
asking his often-timid students withering questions is the beginning and the end of legal
pedagogy for most of us, and for our perceptions on how Socrates is used in legal teaching. 
In consulting two colleagues who have experienced legal pedagogy, I was able to deepen my
understanding of Socratic legal teaching beyond this popular image. 
  Peter Suber, professor of philosophy at Earlham College, holds both the PhD and JD
degrees from Northwestern University.  His description of a law class is truly harrowing: 
"Incorrect answers, undue delays in answering, or overt signs of nervousness are punished
with sardonic jibes or withering glances.  The atmosphere is humiliation; the punishment is
humiliation...The consensus among students is that the method is not 'educational' in any
traditional sense.  It does not help one learn cases or legal reasoning.  It is sadistic" (1990). 
Suber sees ample evidence in the dialogues to think that Socrates behaved similarly. 
Furthermore, Suber believes that the so-called legal Socratic method is used in different
ways in law schools of different levels of prestige (1990).  In the most prestigious category,
students behave in the "Paper Chase" fashion, reciting the facts and attendant arguments
while standing and attempting to answer the professor's questions. 
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  On the other hand, Suber notes what he calls second echelon schools and below may
be places where the method is more humane.  Here there may be more emphasis upon
reasoning and thinking rather than performance.  Unlike the first instance cited, this gentler
use of the method may in fact emphasize "respond(ing) to well-crafted counterfactuals again
and again" (1990) in an atmosphere of support and trust. 
  Another former colleague, Mark Olson, also holds the doctoral degree in philosophy
from Northwestern University and a law degree from the University of California at
Berkeley.  Olson, now a practicing attorney, takes a different tack in discussing his
experience.  He begins by offering a definition of what he carefully calls the "legal Socratic
method:  "(It) employs the use of actual recorded court cases to teach students the rules of
law and their application and justification (whether clear or not, whether persuasive or not),
through the instructor's use of a series of hypotheticals based on the main case and through
the students' discussion of the case and the hypotheticals.  Its successful use and reception
calls for skill and wit" (1990). 
  Olson reminds us of other factors that I agree are crucial to the understanding of the
legacy of Socrates for pedagogy.  The Socratic method evolved in law training as a
"historical formation, which, in its present form presupposed the existence of a legal
casebook" (1990).   Above all for Olson, the method is not a technique; when it is so
practiced it is characteristic of inept instructors.  In those classes students are not probed, but
are allowed to give "unreflective (knee-jerk) responses to complex social issues" (1990). 
  One of my deep seated and cherished beliefs has again been questioned by this
knowledge.  I want to believe, along with Adler and other sanguine educators, that Socratic
teaching is a means to search for truth.  I still muse in uncritical moments about a Socrates,
beneficent and maligned, leading the youth of Athens on the golden path of instruction. 
Even in graduate programs in philosophy one does not discuss often the darker side of this
practice as argued by Stone and Nietzsche, and brought to the fore here in a different way by
Suber and Olson.  Stone's criticism of Socrates is too recent; besides, he built his reputation
as the consummate outsider journalist who only taught himself Greek in his waning years. 
He did not belong to the anointed academic club of classical scholarship.  Nietzsche, though
a classical scholar, is often dismissed as a German at best and a raving crank at worst,
particularly when it comes to his views on Socrates. 
  Yet, this "darker" side of Socrates must be preserved, as I shall contend in the
following section, if we are to truly "use" and not "abuse" Socrates in present day teaching.  
Suber's description of a harrowing law class may be an extreme version of such practice,
though a recent feminist critique of legal education supports Suber’s claims.  Guinier, Fine,
and Balin (1997) go even further to call the legal Socratic method "ritualized combat" that is
harmful and counterproductive to the education and well-being of women law students. 
  Suber’s description of the "sadistic" querying that may go on in higher echelon law
schools may be true to Socrates in one sense; he was relentless and oftentimes unpleasant. 
But we must ask to what end these displays are headed.  In the following section, I shall seek
to show that we must preserve the wily, irascible Socrates most of us have come to love (or
hate) so that at the same time we preserve the core of his mission. 
Conclusion:  Determining the Use and Abuse of Socrates 
  We have seen how Socrates is part of many classroom situations, from Paley's
kindergarten on up to law school.  Which of these are legitimate uses of Socrates and which
are abusive?  To determine such appraisals, I believe we must use several standards.  Abuse
of Socrates does not necessarily come, as might be first thought, when the Socratic "victim"
is mischievously questioned and pierced with sardonic barbs.  Abuse may come rather more
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from well-meaning educators who, perhaps in the joy of discovering a technique that is
liberating and aims toward thinking, strip Socrates of his power.  How could the Socratic
legacy be so diminished? 
  First, we may forget that Socrates at his best was attempting to uncover
self-knowledge and encouraging others to do so too..  He followed his daemon and
eschewed followers.  As both Stone and Suber underscore, Socrates was devious and crafty. 
These factors must lie at the core of any interpretation of Socrates for present day teaching. 
If we apply (and I use this term deliberately) a Socratic method to any topic, this strategy
does not necessarily guarantee that self-knowledge will occur.  Self-knowledge is a difficult
concept, as the irony used by a Socrates or a Soren Kierkegaard seems to suggest.  Yet to
forget the unsavory aspects of Socrates is to forsake the Socratic spirit, and thus to abuse the
legacy of Socrates for education. 
  A related abuse of Socrates in present day teaching comes when we believe
uncritically that Socrates himself was a teacher.  The word teacher makes most of us who
are in the "education business" think of someone who may devise and implement a
curricular rationale.  If Socrates was indeed a teacher, then he must have had a specific
pedagogy and a specific set of topics that can be learned by others, the reasoning goes.  A
central insight of Burbules’s recent book on dialogical teaching (1993) is in seeing clearly
Socratic teaching as a multifarious repertoire.  Burbules argues that Socratically inspired
teachers play a dialogical "game" that, though guided by rules, is sensitive to context. 
Plato’s own writing of the dialogue is itself a Socratic teaching act.  The writer is the
teacher, and the reader, the student, both of the dialogue, and, reflexively, of him or herself.  
But this has not deterred other educators from advocating what they suppose are simple
teachable strategies and curricular objectives derived from Plato's character. 
  While I have observed Mortimer Adler using irony and even humiliation in a manner
akin to Socrates, it is not clear that those trained by him have the confidence or the
temperament to use these ploys.  I have watched well-intentioned teachers trained under
Adler leading supposedly "Socratic" discussions without suggesting even a hint of irony or
challenge, something Adler himself criticizes as "watered-down" seminars (Adler, 1990). 
Perhaps a good number of teachers find themselves incapable of being "mischievous,
disingenuous, and cunning, and occasionally even devious" (Suber, 1990) in the way that
Plato's Socrates was. 
  Conflicts between Socratic teaching and other aims of education are also apparent
and disturbing.  Educators are urged to be supportive, to nurture their students, many of
whom are currently "at-risk."  Teachers must often serve as surrogate parents to students
from dysfunctional families.  I have taught Plato’s Socrates to a number of graduate students
in special education.  They have all told me that using Socratic dialogue moves in their
teaching would be highly problematic if not impossible.  It is thus difficult and perhaps even
at cross-purposes to use such a pedagogical method and encourage the cultivation of
self-knowledge with these students. 
  Here is where the sensitivity, knowledge, and skill of a teacher, well-versed in a
Socratically inspired repertoire of pedagogical strategies and moves in the dialogue game
(Burbules, 1993), comes into play.  In addition, such a teacher must have a sympathetic
understanding of each student and the nuances of that particular classroom climate. 
Otherwise such abuses already discussed such as either a stripping of Socratic teaching to
just a questioning exercise, on the one hand, or the "ritualized combat" experienced by many
women in law classes, could occur. 
  My argument points to the need to recognize an enduring core of the Socratic legacy
for teaching.  Haroutunian-Gordon and others have given enough textual evidence in order
for us to be suspicious of thinking that Socrates was a teacher in any conventional or current
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sense of that term.  Other commentators as diverse as Nietzsche, I.F. Stone, Bruce Kimball,
and Louis Goldman have called attention to the corrosive and even dangerous qualities of
Socratic inquiry.  Yet why does Socrates continue to leave the torpedo's deep marks upon
most anyone who reads the dialogues, and on those of us who are inspired to model his
actions in our own teaching? 
  The Socrates of Plato's dialogues continually cuts past areas of knowledge
apprehended by either episteme or phronesis, theory or practice.  Socrates can make us feel
that the failure to sustain a thesis or find a definition is not just a defeat of intelligence, but
rather a moral disaster (Vlastos, 1971, 1980, p. 6).  Socrates may not have given us a simple
"method" that we can apply to any topic, and it may be difficult to teach Socratically in
today's "antidialogical" schools (Burbules, 1993).  Yet the larger issues raised in the
dialogues must not be ignored.  If anything, Socratic irony confounds many of the simplistic
interpretations of the Socratic legacy for teachiing.  The care of the soul, the project of moral
inquiry, and a searching that cuts across social class should be the first and foremost use, and
ultimate worth, of Socrates for present-day teaching (Vlastos 1971, 1980; see also Gadamer,
1986; Seeskin, 1987; Johnson, 1989). 
Note:  This paper is based on a presentation at AERA.  I wish to thank Jim Garrison, Sophie
Haroutunian-Gordon, Michael Jones, and Ralph Page for comments upon several
subsequent drafts prior to submission, and Gene Glass and four anonymous reviewers for
this journal for their comments subsequent to submission.  
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Rick Garlikov
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Preface
 I am deeply troubled by the comments about Socrates and the Socratic Method that
Anthony G. Rud, Jr. makes in his "The Use and Abuse of Socrates in Present Day Teaching"
(EPAA Volume 5 Number 20, November 24, 1997), because I think they reflect what many
educators today might feel about Socrates as portrayed in the Platonic dialogues; and if so, I
think that is a terrible loss for today's students. In this response I want to deal only with
issues about the Socratic teaching method, not with the interesting, and I think false, claim
Rud seems to accept (ascribing it originally to Nietzsche) about the supposed conflicts
between "rationality" and "creative myth" or between the search for truth and the continuing
of cultural traditions. And I do not wish to consider specific beliefs of Socrates involving
possible errors in reasoning or in the factual knowledge from which he was reasoning. I wish
only to examine issues relevant to instructional methodology.
 What I find particularly troubling is that Rud (and, from his citations, apparently many
others) doesn't see what seems to me to be quite obvious in regard to what Socrates'
methodology is all about.(Note 1) The method of questioning of the slave boy is not unlike
Socrates questioning of Euthyphro or of the many other, often famous and powerful, adults
in the dialogues. So where Rud sees it as displaying "blatant...problems of power and
dominance of an elderly Greek citizen teaching a slave boy," I see the age and class
difference as irrelevant features of that dialogue, since the essential features in it are no
different than in the others, where Socrates questions quite prominent and highly positioned
citizens. Nor, in many cases are the questions, and the answers given by the characters in the
dialogues, very different from what would occur today if one were talking to someone about
those very same subjects in a modern vernacular and with references to contemporary
examples of the same sorts of actions and ideas Socrates gives his examples to illustrate.
 In discussing both Burbules and Haroutunian-Gordon, Rud seems to think it somehow
surprising that Socrates does not follow prescribed formal methods and that he did not have
a "specific pedagogy and a specific set of topics that can be learned by others." I do not
know how to account for finding that surprising. It is quite clear from the dialogues that
Socrates simply had thought deeply about a great many different things, and that he
questioned people who expressed views he thought false about those things to see whether it
was he or they who were in error, probably thinking it more likely they would be the ones
who were mistaken, but entertaining the possibility he was the one who was mistaken. In the
dialogues I have read, it is quite clear that Socrates' analysis is always deeper and more
sustained than the other participants, and that the latter tend to express either unanalyzed,
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unreflective, popular views or views for which they may have some shallow reasons, but not
very good ones - certainly not ones that will withstand scrutiny. To characterize this sort of
inquiry, where one responds to others' views by showing them the problems with those
views, as an "ill-structured teaching situation" that teachers need "to work their way out of"
is to think of teaching much too narrowly as something that can only occur with a particular
topic in a particular formal and prescribed way under particular conditions regardless of
what beliefs or knowledge or ability one's students bring to the classroom. And the
requirement of a specific pedagogy and set of topics ignores the common notion of teaching
as something, say, parents might do when they teach their kids table manners, bicycle riding,
the rules of baseball, how to throw a curve ball, badminton, croquet, how to drive, checkers,
card tricks, how to deal with defeat or disappointment, and a zillion other things that parents
teach children without curricular rationales or systematic, formalized topics offered at
specially chosen preconceived times.
 The method involves teaching things at times they are relevant in ways that are most
relevant to the person one is teaching, or guiding. That necessarily involves being able to
ascertain what they already know or believe and understand that can help you teach them
what you want them to learn. Although there will be similar elements each time you teach
the same topic to different people, some quite different questions and ideas may be required
as well, sometimes extremely different questions. One class I taught in the early 70's was so
wedded to the principle of being true to yourself and honest with everyone else that when we
discussed "When is it right to break a date, and why?" they honestly believed one should
break a date, or do anything whenever one feels like it, regardless of what expense or effort
the other person might have put into preparation for the date, and regardless of how
important it might be to him or her. I thought of every possible question I could to get them
to see that was not really a very good principle and that they really couldn't possibly believe
it, but no matter what case I presented to them, they consistently took what seemed to me to
be the most absurd and untenable position in favor of "doing whatever you really want to"
even if it meant committing murder you thought you could get away with. So I had to use a
very different strategy to get them to see they didn't really believe that principle was a good
one to follow. That was the only group of students I ever taught who held that view; and so
the way I had to deal with them during those classes was different from the way I ever had to
deal with any other group. I don't consider such classes ill-structured teaching situations. I
consider them to be normal teaching situations if one is really trying to address students'
current knowledge, understanding, beliefs, and sincere interests as a starting place to help
them learn.
 And that makes reading Socratic dialogues harder than participating in one. When the
interlocutor gives an answer you would not have given, immediately the dialogue will veer
from the direction it would have taken had you been the one answering. You may lose
interest or you may not understand or appreciate the answer; or you may not "get" the
teacher's response to that answer. Yet you are not there to ask him what s/he means or why
the question is relevant. Further, when you are not a participant, it may be difficult to see
certain things that are important to see in order even to understand the questions. In the
edition I have of the Meno, there is a diagram of the squares Socrates is discussing with the
slave, but it is a finished diagram, containing all the elements Socrates draws out for the
slave boy one at a time as he needs them. It is difficult to tell which lines Socrates is
pointing to as he asks questions about the various squares and their areas relative to each
other. So what might be quite instructive for the slave boy in Socrates' presence as he draws
or points to certain lines in the figure might be more difficult for a reader to understand than
would be reading a straightforward essay or argument. Unless the answers given by another
student are the same as what you would have given, the reading of a Socratic dialogue
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involving him or her is not the same educational experience as participating in such a
dialogue. Even for the same topic, each occurrence of Socratic teaching is potentially quite
different from another. That may explain why someone might see given dialogues as just a
bunch of persistent questions that are "devious" and difficult. They may not appreciate the
point or rationale for the specific questions in a specific dialogue. But since Rud is a
philosopher, presumably knowledgeable about some of the topics in the dialogues, that does
not explain to me his characterization of them that way. I would have thought he would
understand why Socrates chooses the particular questions he does at the times he does.
 Before getting into the method itself, I would like to dispose of two psychological
characteristics Rud associates with it in some cases, that I think are also irrelevant to it: 1)
ridicule of the respondent or of his answers, and 2) paralysis from fear by the respondent
about having to participate in the enterprise. Ridicule can be used with almost any teaching
method, even responding to raised hands, one can call on a student in a hostile and derisive
manner. There is nothing about the Socratic method itself that requires hostility and sarcasm.
And Socrates did not use it that way generally, if at all. To say or imply that because some
people use the method "sadistically"to "humiliate" students in a form of "ritualized combat,"
the method has a "dark" or "unsavory" side ("to forget the unsavory aspects of Socrates is to
forsake the Socratic spirit...", among other such passages) is like saying that because some
people lecture in a boring manner, that lectures are by nature boring, or that because some
jokes are tasteless that humor is by nature tasteless.
 Further, neither the slave boy nor many of the other people Socrates questioned
seemed to be numbed by fear of making some sort of mistake. Used in an engaging and kind
way, there is no need for the method to be threatening. And while many students or
colleagues tend to become suspicious "something is up" when someone, particularly a
philosopher, launches into what seem to be Socratic types of questions, that seldom ties
many tongues, unless one feels interrogated and threatened by the questioner for reasons
other than his/her asking questions. Many of the characters in the dialogues do seem to find
excuses to leave the discussions when they find their initial views untenable, but they don't
seem hesitant to be in the discussions up to that point. For students, who are often not so
wedded to a view that they find a successful challenge to it unbearable, the Socratic method
is often quite exciting. My experience in using it with "at risk" or students with low GPA's
and/or low self-esteem is that they find it interesting, challenging, stimulating, helpful, and
nurturing. Rural Alabama students and urban inner-city students alike have said they wished
their previous courses had been as thought-provoking, challenging, and attentive to their
own ideas. Students often prefer to have their ideas taken seriously and disagreed with and
questioned than to have them ignored or patronizingly given a good grade with no real
critical or analytical attention paid to them. It is a terrible mistake to see the Socratic Method
as being always and automatically antithetical to nurturing or supportive teaching. It only
appears that way on the surface, or perhaps to people who don't think any ideas should be
probed too deeply or their advocates challenged to justify them.
 Finally in this preface, Socrates answers Rud's objection that "It is not made clear in
the dialogue that the slave boy is somehow capable of using his knowledge." Socrates says
what I think is true: "At present these notions have just been stirred up in him, as if in a
dream; but if he were frequently asked the same questions in different forms, he would know
as well as anyone at last." The way I tell this to people whom I teach photography is to say,
"In two lessons [about four hours total time] I will teach you almost everything there is to
know about photography so that you will understand it all. But you will not be able to apply
it automatically or even keep it all in mind, for it will not have "sunk in". For that you will
need to shoot pictures and bring them to me so that I can go over them and analyze them
with you in light of the principles I will have taught you. That is when your understanding
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will start to sink in and become automatic(ally applied)."
The Socratic Method
 The Socratic Method is simply a way, through asking certain sorts of pointed and
stimulating, interesting or "live" questions, to get students, or anyone, to focus on the
elements one thinks important for understanding of an idea or phenomena, in an order or
perspective likely to help them gain that understanding. The idea is that by asking leading
questions -- often logically leading questions-- about the elements one is bringing attention
to, the other person will be able to see what you see about the idea or phenomena and will
then attain the same understanding of it that you do.
 The method only works with regard to logical/conceptual types of material; one does
not learn "facts" via the Socratic Method, not directly anyway. (It may help the discovery of
new facts by showing where one might need to "look" for phenomena, in the same way that
theoretical physics often fosters discoveries in applied physics.) However, it can be used to
make learning facts easier, by organizing their introduction to the student in a way likely to
be more meaningful to him or her. More about this below, with regard to teaching
photography.
 When Socrates says it is not teaching, there are a number of things he might mean: (1)
that it is not about telling anyone facts, or teaching them a skill (2) that it is not about telling
anyone any thing s/he does not already know, in some sense of know, (3) that it only works
with people who have some appreciation for, and sense of, inference, (4) that it is not about
learning new things, but about putting into perspective things one knows but does not fully
attend to or see the significance of, and/or (5) that it only applies to logical/conceptual
aspects of material, not to the transfer of factual information . In the Apology, Socrates
contrasts his kind of knowledge or wisdom with that of farmers, poets, etc. He does not have
the kind of knowledge they have, which can be taught. He has a different sort of knowledge
or insight. And he cannot "teach" one to have that, but he can demonstrate the results of his
insight to others in certain ways, if they are willing and able to be receptive in certain ways. I
consider what Socrates does to be teaching, even if he did not, because I consider
methodically and intentionally fostering particular new perspectives and greater
understanding in another person to be one (extremely important) form or aspect of teaching.
But it is definitely not the same thing as trying to tell or teach facts or fact-based skills.
 But the Method differs from just asking questions, especially open-ended or
non-leading questions, or ones that one does not know the answer to oneself. That is in part
why it is a teaching method, not just a brain-storming activity nor an activity whose point is
merely to inspire thought or research by simply asking general or open-ended questions or
questions one does not know the answer to oneself. Bill Hunter and I had a long e-mail
debate, which is available in an edited form at
http://www.Garlikov.com/teaching/dialogue.html about whether fostering research or
discovery by students, via questions the questioner may not know the answer to, is teaching.
 I use the Socratic Method for teaching many things. For a transcript of a fairly "pure"
(i.e., questions only) use of the method, with commentary about it, for teaching a
logical/conceptual idea see my "The Socratic Method: Teaching by Asking Instead of by
Telling", http://www.Garlikov.com/Soc_Meth.html, But I also use the method for
organizing material when I teach, say, photography; and for getting students to see mistakes
in their reasoning in any subject matter area. An example of the latter case was in a
discussion of homosexuality in an "Ethics and Society" course where many students said
that homosexuality was wrong because (the idea of) it was so disgusting. I asked them
whether they thought that such disgust was a sufficient characteristic to make an action be
immoral. They said it was. I asked them then to close their eyes and think about ... their
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parents having sex with each other. They all let out an even bigger groan of disgust, and said
they found that idea really disgusting. So I asked whether they would have to conclude then
that it was immoral for their parents ever to have (or to have had) sex with each other. They
agreed it was not. Of course they then asked whether that meant I thought homosexuality
was moral. My response was that whether it is or is not is simply unrelated to whether it is
personally disgusting or not to anyone. I was not trying to argue in this particular case for or
against the morality of homosexuality, but was merely trying to get them to see that finding
an action disgusting did not justify their thinking it must be immoral just because of that.
Having introduced the point to them in that dramatic ("Torpedo's touch"?) way, we then go
on to talk about other activities that they might sometimes characterize as disgusting but not
immoral - such as dietary preferences that may be quite different from one's own, surgical
procedures, etc.-- so that that one example is not seen to be either an anomaly or a complete
explanation.
 As to helping present facts in a manner conducive to seeing their significance, when I
teach photography, I give certain demonstrations and then ask leading questions about them.
Most people, even a great many who have taken a photography course or two, do not
understand very well the significance of shutter speeds, aperture settings, or film ISO
numbers. And they do not see that all these are related to each other in a simple way, nor
what that portends for their picture-taking. So I open the back of an empty camera, remove
the lens cap, and point the camera toward a light surface and trip the shutter, first at different
shutter speeds, and then after some questions, at different aperture settings, letting them see
what happens. After the shutter speed demonstration I ask them which shutter speeds let in
more light, the ones where the shutter is open longer or shorter. They pretty clearly see that
the longer the shutter is open, the more light comes in from a given source. After I point out
that the shutter speed numbers are actually just reciprocals of time measured in seconds
(e.g., 250 stands for 1/250 second, 2 stands for ½ second, etc.) I then ask how much more or
less light is let in between each shutter speed on the dial. Except for one place where an
insignificantly slight adjustment is made in the system, because the time increments between
shutter speeds are doubled (or halved in the other direction), they immediately see that
changing shutter speeds doubles or halves the amount of light let onto the film by a given
source, all other things being equal. Letting light from a source go through an opening for
one second, for example, allows twice as much light to come in as does allowing it to go
through for half a second.
 I then go through the same thing with regard to aperture setting. "Which lets in more
light?" Obviously the larger opening will. Then I simply tell them that the aperture system is
designed in such a way that the difference between adjacent apertures also lets in twice or
half as much light, depending on the direction one is going. Then I ask them how much
different the amount of light let in is if I were to increase the shutter speed by one click, and
also increase the size of the aperture by one click. They see that is the same amount of light.
I do it again, and again. All the changes make no change in the amount of light let in to the
film. It does not take them long to ask their own question, which is some variation on "Then
how do you choose which combination to use, if they all do the same thing?" I take that
question to be one sign they are understanding what I have been teaching them so far. And
that question allows me to go into the properties shutter speeds and apertures control in
addition to amount of light.
 Now one of the, I think unjustified, criticisms of the Socratic Method is that the
questions are not so much logically leading in a way to give insight as they are
psychologically merely prompting questions whose answers are obvious from verbal or
psychological cues rather than from attention to the content. This may be what Rud means
when he says that Socrates begins by putting words in the mouth of the slave. I can discuss
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this criticism better with an example of my own from a criticism of my Socratic Method
paper. There is a place in that paper where I report asking a group of third grade students
how many numerals there are in our (Arabic, decimal) numbering system. At first the
answer the class shouts out is "nine"; then someone says "ten" and there is some agreement
with that. So I asked "Which is it, nine or ten," and they all yelled back "Ten!" I took that,
whether mistakenly or not, as a sign that they were now including zero as a numeral that
they had initially neglected to consider when they said "nine." My next question was "If we
list the numerals in order, starting with zero, what will the list be?" I was taken to task by a
critic of the method for essentially telling the students zero was a numeral. I don't think I
did, because I was pretty certain their change from nine to ten implied they realized zero was
a numeral to consider, but I can see how someone might think so. However, it is really an
irrelevant criticism of the method, though it may be a justified criticism of this particular
application of the method. Had I been more precise or more thorough, or had I thought it
necessary, I would have asked something like "Why did you change from 'nine' to 'ten'?" or
"What are the ten numerals?" If zero were still missing, I could have asked something that
would have got them to realize it, by, say, holding up a closed fist and asking how many
fingers I was 'holding up'. When they said "none," I could have asked how they might write
"none" numerically. Or if I asked them what the lowest numeral was and they had said
"One," I could have asked them whether there was not some number lower than one. I
assume that somehow or other we could have easily got to zero, and to their recalling and
recognizing it was the lowest numeral. At that point the class would have continued as it
then did in the original.
 As to the answers to the individual questions in a Socratic dialogue being prompted by
cues other than logic, there are four responses I would make to dispute that. 1) You cannot
get satisfactory answers to the later questions without first having gone through the earlier
questions, so at least these later questions by themselves obviously do not contain the clues
for answering them. 2) There are people who "get lost" and cannot answer the middle to
later questions in a chain of questions that develops a line of reasoning. They cannot make
connections as they go along. They report that they cannot "follow" the line of thought being
developed. 3) When people do successfully follow a chain of questions, they usually report
that suddenly they "see" how all this [whatever is being explained or taught] works. They
display a "Eureka" experience that cannot be accounted for by their having answered easy
individual questions whose answers were obvious by the way the questions were asked. And
4) one can often see students make insightful comments or ask penetrating questions that
show they are starting to catch on to things greater or more encompassing than your
individual questions have covered - comments and questions they could not make or ask at
the beginning of the chain of questions. 
 
Rick Garlikov
Notes
1. Rud at one point talks about Sophie Haroutunian-Gordon's operating from a "close"
reading of the dialogues, and some of the comments he makes, especially about the
geometric derivation Socrates goes through with the slave boy, indicate he and other critics
may not be operating from that kind of reading. I would have thought any analysis would
necessitate operating from a "close" reading, but perhaps that is neither required nor
expected in "citation-based" or "reference-based" scholarship or analysis based on
deconstruction. When Rud says, for example, "...Socrates makes Meno uncomfortable with
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his persistent questions" that strikes me as an odd description of the origin of discomfort of
the participants in the dialogues. It is not that Socrates has persistent questions as a
three-year-old might or as a heckler at a political rally might; and it is not that his questions
are difficult or embarrassing. The crux of the discomfort in many of the dialogues is that
Socrates' specific questions lead logically and, in a sense forcefully, to ideas the participants
cannot, or do not want to have to, entertain or accept. And when Rud says things like
"Socrates was devious and crafty" or that Socratically inspired teachers are good at playing
some sort of "dialogue game," it seems to miss the point in the same way it would miss the
point to analyze Einstein's work by saying only that Einstein was intelligent but unusual in
his thinking, and that his theories are quite strange. Furthermore, since "devious" and
"crafty" imply gamesmanship or trickery of some sort, their use paints a picture quite
different from the picture I see of Socrates as I read the dialogues. I see the Socrates of the
Euthyphro, Meno, Republic, Apology, and other dialogues I have read as insightful, brilliant,
understanding, sincere, honest, and passionately opposed to loose and fallacious thinking.
But I only came to see him that way after teaching modern versions of the same topics, and
seeing that the views contemporary students and adults hold about those topics are not very
different from the views portrayed by the Platonic participants, and that the same objections
or arguments Socrates used, apply as well.
